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Essay
DIVERSITY AND THE PRACTICE OF
INTEREST ASSESSMENT
ROBERT F. NAGEL†
INTRODUCTION
When enforcing the Constitution, courts frequently assess and
even rank the importance of governmental interests.1 The associated
terminology—invidious,
legitimate,
important,
substantial,
compelling—is a familiar part of the doctrinal landscape. Despite
some controversies about specifics, the practice itself is usually
accepted as a normal, perhaps, unavoidable part of constitutional
interpretation.2 Most observers, then, take it for granted that the
boundaries of governmental power should be located in a way that
takes into account the importance of the state’s regulatory purpose.
As a result, there is often only a thin line between asking whether a
law is constitutional and asking whether it is justified.
As congenial as this state of affairs may be to the pragmatic
American mind, it is not inevitable. For instance, the Court’s

Copyright © 2004 by Robert F. Nagel.
† Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado Law
School. An earlier version of this paper was presented as the annual Brainerd Currie Memorial
Lecture at Duke University School of Law on November 13, 2003.
1. Among the provisions interpreted to require judicial inquiry into the validity and
importance of the government’s purpose are the Free Speech Clause, the religion clauses, the
Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
the “dormant” Commerce Clause, and the Uniformity Clause of Article I, Section 8. Several
representative doctrines are laid out in Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 166–68 nn.3–18 (1985)
2. One account describes the practice of taking social need into consideration when
defining rights as one of America’s “shared constitutional first principles.” H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS
205, 207 (2002).
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determination that regulation of guns in public schools is beyond the
commerce power rests on grounds that are entirely independent of
whether it is a good thing to keep guns out of the hands of school
3
children. Nor is judicial inquiry into the importance of the
governmental interest self-evidently desirable. Indeed, it is easy to
characterize the practice in a way that is disturbing, at least to some
sensibilities. Suppose that, rather than saying that Constitutional
meaning takes into account the importance of state objectives, courts
said that the importance of these objectives justifies something less
than a full realization of the Constitution. A society given to
reverence for “permanent” and “fundamental” constitutional values
might be expected to object to open acknowledgement that the
government can diminish or ignore constitutional requirements
simply because legislators and judges think a violation warranted. No
doubt this is why courts usually prefer to treat the importance of the
governmental interest as a factor relevant to the meaning of the
document rather than as a justification for making exceptions to that
meaning.4
However, in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s
use of racial preferences in its admissions program, the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger5 came very close to saying that the
importance of the state’s interest justifies an exception to or a
suspension of correct constitutional meaning.6 Despite acknowledging
that “there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of
7
[racial] preference” and, indeed, that a “core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally

3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (basing its holding on the fact that
“[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce”).
4. An extreme example is Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
in which the Court relied on “a growing appreciation of public needs” to eviscerate the
Contracts Clause even while insisting that “[e]mergency does not create power.” Id. at 442, 425.
There are, however, some counterexamples. For instance, when first approving busing as a
remedy for racially segregated schools, the Court observed that district courts would exceed
their authority to remedy constitutional violations if they required bus rides that were so long as
to threaten students’ health. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31
(1971).
5. 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003).
6. See id. at 2346 (holding that “race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in
time” because a “permanent justification for racial preferences would offend . . . equal
protection”).
7. Id. at 2345 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)).
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imposed discrimination based on race,”8 the majority concluded that
the racial discrimination practiced by the law school was carefully
aimed at achieving a compelling purpose, namely diversity. The Court
therefore found no constitutional violation.9 If in twenty-five years, as
the Justices expected, the use of racial preferences becomes
unnecessary to achieve “the interest approved [in Grutter],” the same
racial discrimination will, it appears, become a constitutional
violation.10
In this essay, I begin by discussing what it means to assert, as the
Court did in Grutter, that the government’s interest in diversity is
compelling. Before proceeding, I want to say a personal word about
that topic, which I approach with considerable reluctance. This
reluctance is based in part on my long-held sense that everything that
can be said about affirmative action has been said many times over. It
is also based on the knowledge that the subject of diversity in
educational institutions is highly sensitive. Moreover, I am
intimidated by the distance between the opposing positions on this
issue. For most, the word “diversity” self-evidently encompasses large
11
and noble goals—a “dream” as Justice O’Connor put it in Grutter.
But for some others, the whole idea is just as plainly hypocritical,
empty, and pernicious. In my professional experience, the depth and
power of this disagreement leads people to avoid the subject, a
tendency that is encouraged by the fact that, in most universities,
diversity programs are a solidly established fact of life. Consequently,
although the word “diversity” and the issues it presents are widely
and passionately discussed in journals and judicial opinions, I have
seldom seen it seriously discussed in person among educators, even
(or especially) while they are making real-life, professional judgments
about admissions, curriculum, or hiring. So, for all these reasons, I
enter this terrain reluctantly.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has declared that
12
deference to educators’ judgments about the importance of diversity
justifies governmental preferences that are at odds with “a core
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,”13 those of us who have been
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2346 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
Id. at 2347.
Id. at 2347.
Id. at 2341.
Id. at 2339.
See also supra text accompanying note 8 (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432).
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reluctant ought to face up to the issue more than we have. This
discussion, as I have stated, begins with my effort to understand what
it means to say that diversity is a compelling purpose. It then
proceeds to the more important question of what that understanding
might reveal about the practice of interest assessment generally.
I. ASSESSING DIVERSITY
Taken at face value, the Grutter Court’s depiction of the values
served by diversity in higher education is certainly attractive. Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion began by adverting to Justice Powell’s
idea that judicial respect for educational judgments about how best to
achieve “a robust exchange of ideas” is grounded in notions of
academic freedom and free speech.14 She then described the range of
educational advantages achieved through a racially diverse student
body. Not only is classroom discussion “livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening,”15 but students learn about members of
other races and, in the process, become skeptical of racial stereotypes.
Justice O’Connor recognized these effects as important educational
benefits in their own right. She also said that they prepare students
for later interactions in “an increasingly diverse workforce and
society.”16 Her opinion went on to underscore that the ability to
operate in an interracial society is important to the functioning of
major organizations, including businesses and the military.17 Indeed,
having people of diverse ethnicities participate in such organizations
and in “civic life” more generally “is essential,” according to Justice
O’Connor if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”18
This dream “of one Nation” is no idle abstraction, for the opinion
went on to claim that the “legitimacy” of this Nation’s social and
governmental leadership requires that members of every race be
19
represented in elite positions.

14. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
15. Id. at 2340 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 244a).
16. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American Educational Research Association et al.
at 3).
17. Id. at 2340.
18. Id. at 2340–41.
19. See id. at 2341 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”).
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Thus, diversity in higher education serves not only specific
educational purposes but also some of the same political purposes
that the Supreme Court has on occasion claimed for its own work.
20
Diversity, like certain constitutional decisions of the Court, is
thought to stand as a bulwark against illegitimacy and
fragmentation—or, put more affirmatively, as an embodiment of
aspirations for a just society. Although the O’Connor opinion
adhered to Justice Powell’s earlier rejection of the claim that making
up for a diffuse history of racial discrimination is adequate to justify
racial preferences in higher education, it ended up embracing a more
affirmative version of that goal. Society is not permitted to look back
to correct a history of hatred and inequality, but it may look forward
to the achievement of harmony, cohesion, and evident fairness.21
How, one might ask, could anyone doubt that all this represents a
compelling public purpose?
The answer, of course, is that critics do not take these purposes
at face value. They begin by denying that these are the actual
purposes of the affirmative action program at the Michigan Law
School. As the Grutter dissenters pointed out, racial preferences at
Michigan seem to have counted just about enough to generate
admission rates equivalent to the percentages in the applicant pool
and, therefore, to generate attendance rates close to the same
proportion.22 This proportion, the dissenters charged, bore no
relationship to the laudable objectives asserted by the University.
How could it be, for example, that a critical mass of 1 percent Native
Americans reflected the number necessary to vitalize class discussions
and break down discredited stereotypes, whereas 9 percent was the
critical mass of African Americans necessary to achieve the same
result?23 Similarly, how could the necessity for lessons on how to
interact with a particular race depend more on that race’s proportion
in the applicant pool than on its relative isolation in society or the
degree of prejudice held against it? Although the goal of political

20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–69 (1992) (discussing the Court’s
role in preserving governmental legitimacy); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989)
(discussing the Court’s role in preserving loyalty and national unity).
21. This shift in perspective was proposed as early as 1986 by Kathleen M. Sullivan in
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78
(1986).
22. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2368 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
23. See id. (reporting the admission rates for different each racial minority).
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legitimacy might be achieved by (among other things) effective
representation of the various races in leadership positions,
effectiveness is not guaranteed by, or even necessarily related to,
proportionality. More subtle preconditions for legitimacy—for
example, Professor Robert Post’s suggestion that a democratic
culture requires leaders who can both represent and transcend racial
24
groups —have to do with attitudes and predispositions that, even if
furthered in some subtle way through preferential admissions
practices, are surely not related to proportionality. In short, the
criticism is that the racial proportionality of programs like the one at
the Michigan Law School reveals that they cannot, in fact, be aimed
at their announced purposes.
Different critics see different purposes behind the design of
affirmative action programs like Michigan’s. One obvious possibility
is that racial proportionality is a rough measure of what is necessary
to redress a history of racial discrimination. Indeed, the objective of
correcting prior injustices makes some sense of the goal of racial
proportionality. At one time proponents of affirmative action
forthrightly argued that members of disadvantaged races should be
represented in the classroom, in social intercourse, and in leadership
positions in roughly the same ratio as their percentage in the whole
population because that is an approximation of the likely distribution
that would have existed in the absence of a history of racial prejudice
and discrimination.25 At least arguably, the percentage of each race in
the applicant pool may be the closest practical approximation of its
percentage in the general population. However—so goes the
argument—because the purpose of correcting historical inequities has
been legally insufficient to justify racial preferences since 1977, when
Bakke was decided, schools have had to conceal their true objectives.
This criticism has considerable power. There can be no doubt
that many affirmative action programs were originally undertaken to
compensate for past discrimination; indeed, there are still outspoken

24. See Robert Post, Introduction to RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
13, 22 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (“Democracy . . . entails the perpetual process
of reconciling the self-determination of autonomous wills with the collective self-determination
of a polity.”).
25. Justice Brennan went so far as to argue that it was reasonable to conclude that, but for
pervasive racial discrimination, identified minority applicants would have been more qualified
than Bakke himself for admission to the Davis Medical School even in the absence of that
school’s special admissions program. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 365–66
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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voices in the academy insisting that this is their proper purpose.26 That
purpose would also explain why diversity proponents are intensely
worried about racial imbalances but often seem unconcerned about
the absence from the classroom of other kinds of groups. (If
advocates of racial diversity have ever pushed for admission of a
critical mass of pro-life students or religious fundamentalists or, for
that matter, anarchists, I, like many other observers,27 must have been
absent that day.) The objective of making up for past discrimination
would explain why, as I observed earlier, faculties devote so little
time and attention to discussing or studying the actual effects of racial
diversity on classroom discussion. And it also could help explain the
anomaly that the diversity movement, along with its ideal of robust
interchange, should have come into full flower during approximately
the same period when many universities have undertaken strenuous
efforts to sanitize discourse.
Still, even on the assumption that one main objective of most
affirmative action admissions programs is the unspoken one of
compensating for historical injustices, it does not follow that the
articulated objectives are less than compelling. If for some reason it is
true that correcting a history of racial discrimination is not a
“compelling” purpose, the objective is not for that reason illegitimate.
Programs motivated by remedial aims can also serve the kinds of
purposes that the Grutter opinion endorsed. In fact, although it makes
for some awkwardness and complexity, a program designed to
achieve both a “compelling” purpose (like educational vigor) and a
merely desirable purpose (like overcoming historical inequities)
would seem, all other things being equal, not less but more justified
than one unequivocally aimed only at a single compelling objective. If
a governmental interest is truly important morally or politically, I
26. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 46 (2003) (reporting
Professor Jack Balkin’s views); Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s
Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 765 (1997) (calling “freedom fighting” the primary
reason for seeking racial diversity in schools); James Boyd White, What’s Wrong with Our Talk
about Race? On History, Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1949
(2002) (describing “past or present deprivation, discrimination, or oppression” as the primary
purpose for affirmative action).
27. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 36–37, 47–48 (setting forth a variety of examples
to show that “the arguments that universities offer with regard to ostensibly diversity-oriented
admissions policies are underinclusive”); Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
1105, 1106 (“What the Diversity! movement seeks is a payment made by educational
institutions, at the expense of individuals seeking admission or employment, to compensate
members of groups said to be disadvantaged by historic injustices to their ancestors.”).
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cannot see why it should become less so because it was not the
28
proponents’ original purpose or is not now their only purpose. Nor
should it matter that it is not their primary purpose or even their real
purpose. In such circumstances, the proponents might, to their critics,
seem annoyingly opportunistic—perhaps even devious or
hypocritical29—but the moral worth of the government’s interest is
independent of the tactics or character of those who favor the
interest.
Of course, this rather abstract response is persuasive only if the
educational benefits of racial diversity are real and substantial. This
the critics deny, and it must be acknowledged that the nature and
extent of these benefits are highly questionable. The problem is not
merely that empirical studies are provisional and, in any event, less
30
than clear-cut. The problem is that, as Professors Peter Schuck and
31
32
Peter Wood (among others ) have argued, government programs
aimed at generating diversity may undermine real diversity by making
differences seem inauthentic and denatured. The problem goes
further yet, for, as the Grutter opinion demonstrates, the idealistic
purposes thought to justify racial preferences seem wholly
independent of measurable outcomes. To begin with, consider the
immediate educational benefits. Justice O’Connor contended that
these include a robust exchange of ideas, but she also insisted that a
robust exchange of ideas does not entail any assumption that minority
students “always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint.”33 In fact, another educational benefit is that
students discover that “such stereotypes” are untrue or at least that

28. For a patient exploration of the possibility—indeed, the unavoidability—of
understanding diversity programs as serving multiple purposes, see LEVINSON, supra note 26,
at 46.
29. Professor Carrington, for instance, gives voice to this understandable sense of
exasperation when he writes, “By borrowing Justice Powell’s term for appropriate race
consciousness, the current [diversity] movement is, not to mince words, a fraud.” Carrington,
supra note 27, at 1106.
30. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 165 (2003) (arguing that affirmative action programs “may in fact be pursuing a
spurious or formalistic kind of diversity”).
31. See PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 292 (2003) (“Diversity
itself can pose as a form of equality, at least in imagining an ideal of equalized groups.”).
32. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 27, at 1143 (“[T]o treat a personal characteristic
alone . . . as a measure of one’s capacity to contribute to intellectual exchange may actually
reduce that capacity.”).
33. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003) (quoting Respondents’ Brief at 30).
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they have “diminish[ed] force.”34 In a few highly nuanced sentences,
then, the Court veered cheerfully from one possibility to another: (1)
that minority group members have different enough experiences that
they are more likely than others to provide certain ideas or
perspectives that will be useful to classroom discussion, (2) that
minority group members do not have identifiable viewpoints and that
the elimination of such stereotypes is what makes their participation
in classroom discussion so useful, and (3) that minority group
members do have distinctive viewpoints—but only some of the
time—and that the discovery that this is true is valuable because it
reduces (or, one assumes, fine-tunes) racial stereotypes. In short, no
matter what students learn from a racially diverse class, it is valuable.
This rather flexible line of thought could be extended. The
Court, for example, suggested that racial diversity is educationally
beneficial because it elicits strong exchanges of views, increasing the
energy level of the discussion.35 But, if studies were to conclude that
racial diversity in the classroom actually inhibits discussion (on,
perhaps, at least some sensitive issues), then this very sense of
inhibition could be called a valuable indicator of deep feelings and
racial insecurities. Similarly, the Court alluded to the improved
relationships among students of different races. But, if studies were to
show that relationships (presumably, under certain conditions)
actually become more competitive and hostile, then this very hostility
might be deemed an important cautionary lesson.
Much the same is true of the more remote objectives approved in
Grutter. Students, the Court claimed, must be prepared for interacting
36
in a multiracial society. Such preparation would be necessary if
American institutions and organizations in fact turn out to be
populated by many races and if the members of those races interact a
great deal rather than self-segregate. In this instance, the benefit
would arise because interracial understanding would allow
participants to adjust to the happy circumstance of racial
intermingling. But the same preparation would also be necessary if
some races were not proportionately represented in institutions and
organizations or if the members tended toward noncooperation and
self-segregation. The benefit in this circumstance would arise because

34.
35.
36.

Id. at 2341.
Id. at 2339–40.
Id.
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interracial understanding would allow participants to ameliorate or
even overcome the unfortunate circumstance of racial isolation.
Finally, it might be true that racial proportionality tends to increase
the legitimacy of society’s leadership by creating an impression that
representation is fair and effective. But if people do not see racially
proportional representation as fair and effective—if some see it as a
spoils system and others as a sign of the impossibility of achieving
true political responsiveness—then proponents of affirmative action
still could construe the resulting dissatisfaction as a pressing reason
for diversity programs. After all, if legitimacy is in doubt under
patterns of racially proportionate leadership, how much worse might
the situation become under racially disproportionate patterns? The
reality of racial participation at least holds the potential, over time, of
convincing people that the system is, or is becoming, legitimate.
At first glance, this imperviousness to falsification would seem a
crushing problem. It suggests that proponents want affirmative action
programs whether or not the programs produce real diversity, indeed,
no matter what their consequences. But wait. Supporting a program
regardless of what happens is not so strange as it first sounds. To take
a famous and influential example, John Stuart Mill argued that
unwelcome opinions should not be silenced whether those opinions
37
are wholly true, partly true, or entirely false. He argued that if
wholly true, the expression of unwelcome opinions might help truth
to emerge; if partly true, they can refine our understanding of what is
true; and if false, they help prevent truth from becoming dead dogma.
Note that Mill’s argument still has force even if a true opinion is
never accepted because his argument is only that tolerance makes the
emergence of truth or partial truth possible.38 Similarly, the argument
that without exposure to dissent truth will become dead dogma does
not require that every unwelcome opinion have the effect of making
truth more vivid. It only requires that without continuing examination
truth will eventually become stale. Thus, Mill’s argument holds
without regard to either the truth of the unwelcome opinion or the
actual outcome of debate. The general conviction that untrammeled
debate is good no matter what its immediate consequences is carried

37. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–46 (E. Haldeman-Julius ed., HaldemanJulius Co. 1925) (1859) (“[S]ilencing the expression of an opinion is . . . robbing the human
race.”).
38. Mill wrote, “[W]e may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the
human mind is capable of receiving it.” Id. at 23.
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forward to the present day in highly respected and influential
arguments for the open marketplace of ideas.
Mill’s argument works independently of the immediate
consequences of tolerance because ultimately it presents an aspiration
more than a prediction. The human capacity to reason about truth is
mysterious; in some individuals and in some circumstances it is weak
or nonexistent, but in others it is astonishingly potent. Mill’s
argument rests on the conjecture or the hope that the capacity for
truth is sufficiently available that it is worth preserving the necessary
preconditions for its attainment. Even if, under a given set of
conditions, no human were rational enough either to communicate or
appreciate truth, a Millian might entertain the hope that conditions
might change or even that treating people as rational agents might
help transform them into rational agents. If faced with the radical
claim that no human in any circumstance can appreciate truth, a
determined Millian might reply that this radical claim itself could
eventually turn out to be false and it is on this hope that dissenting
opinions should be tolerated. The conjectural, aspirational character
of Mill’s argument is a reflection of its scale and profundity, not a sign
that its objective is unimportant.
Something similar, I think, can be said of the goals of racial
diversity programs. It does not matter what specific lessons are
learned from members of other races or—in particular
circumstances—whether any lessons are learned at all, because
without diversity there is less chance of learning anything from
members of other races. It is not dispositive that the patterns of
interaction in society at large are uncertain because it is at least
possible that these patterns, whether benign or hostile, will be
improved by interracial experience at the university level. And, yes,
the sources of political legitimacy are psychological and highly
conjectural, but the importance of legitimacy is not for that reason
diminished. In the end, diversity is a compelling interest because of
the ideals and hopes that it represents. Independent of its immediate
consequences, racial proportionality is a tangible sign of inclusion, an
expression of good faith, an embodiment of the desire for racial
understanding and harmony. Diversity, then, is compelling to the
extent that it expresses shared moral norms thought essential to a
decent society.
Some of the most potent criticisms of affirmative action in
university admissions concede—even celebrate—the attractiveness of
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diversity as a societal aspiration. Professor Schuck, for example,
perceptively describes how cultural and attitudinal variety can make
39
individual choices richer and social decisions more adaptive.
Similarly, Professor Wood’s colorful diatribe concedes (indeed, revels
in) the excitement and usefulness of real diversity. Wood writes, “I
don’t know of anyone who argues that social ‘uniformity’ or ethnic
40
‘homogeneity’ make for a better education or a more just society.”
Professors Schuck and Wood are nevertheless critics of
government-imposed racial diversity, arguing that it has significant
costs, such as degraded discourse and individual unfairness, and that
it actually undermines the attractive values of real (nonengineered)
diversity. Now, it might be tempting to jump from the claim that a
government program entails great cost and risk to the conclusion that
its purpose cannot be “compelling” in the doctrinal sense. However,
efforts to implement truly great public purposes will often involve
both high cost and risk because it is precisely the great governmental
objectives that are considered important enough to justify large
burdens and uncertainties. History, needless to say, is replete with
various kinds of profoundly significant governmental initiatives—for
example, strategies of military deterrence, educational reform
41
measures, the imposition of the New York Times malice standard—
that have been both burdensome and uncertain. Those who oppose
racial preference programs on instrumental grounds may well be right
in their bleak observations and dire predictions; they may be wiser or
more prudent, at least in the short run, than those who support such
programs. But even valid instrumental objections concern the best
method for achieving a set of goals. They do not establish that the
goals themselves are politically unimportant or morally weak.
Nevertheless, it might seem that engineered diversity cannot be a
compelling purpose in the doctrinal sense if there is a less risky, less

39. See SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 56–72 (using four different political-social theories to
demonstrate the values that diversity implicates).
40. WOOD, supra note 31, at 135; see also LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 17 (“[I]t is becoming
ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say . . . that institutional or social
homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”); Carrington, supra note 27, at
1110 (“[F]ew question the value of diverse literary, artistic, religious, or other traditions that
may be a source of comfort, satisfaction, or pride to any group, or that contribute to the richness
of our shared American culture.”).
41. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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costly way to achieve the desired objectives.42 In effect, the Grutter
Court adopted this view when it asked whether racial diversity could
be achieved without specific forms or degrees of racial preference.
Surely, one might think, a program cannot have a compelling
justification if its goals could be achieved in a different, less
troublesome way. But, again, this argument has force only if the goals
of diversity are understood as narrowly instrumental. It is true, of
course, that some amount of racial diversity would exist in higher
education without any racial preferences in admissions. It is also true,
as the Grutter dissenters charged,43 that students can and do learn
about attitudes associated with minority experiences long before they
come to law school. Even in law school, students can be assigned
books about the minority experience and, indeed, whole courses can
be designed to meet this need. Students can visit or work in minority
neighborhoods. Later, racial harmony in the workplace can be
achieved the same way most work-related skills are achieved—
through on-the-job training and, assuming that racial animosities are
costly and unpleasant, through the operation of ordinary incentives
and experiences.44 The moral and political legitimacy of society’s
leadership can be established in part through visibly fair competition
and through responsive, transparent institutions. These suggestions
for alternatives to racial proportionality are not trivial or artificial. In
fact, against the great tides of practical experience, economic reality,
and political life that move outside the law school, racial diversity in
the classroom might well represent only a small eddy.
But none of the alternative methods for achieving racial
understanding and harmony achieves the expressive purposes
inherent in diversity programs based on racial preferences. For one
thing, most of the alternative methods, even if effective in some ways,
are not purposeful collective actions and therefore cannot embody
shared moral commitments. Even purposeful alternatives, like
42. I recognize, of course, that the Court’s formulations separate under different “prongs”
the issue of the importance of the purpose and the issue of “less drastic means,” as if they were
unrelated to one another.
43. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting
that cross-racial understanding can be learned by “people three feet shorter and twenty years
younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions
ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens”).
44. On market pressures as a cure for racial discrimination, see generally RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS (1992).
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courses designed to educate on racial history and experience, do not
involve the same sacrifices as do diversity programs and so do not
express the same level of moral conviction and determination.
To summarize, then, the criticisms leveled at diversity do
establish that it is not a compelling public objective in any immediate,
instrumental sense. But the importance and power of diversity do not
depend on achieving specific, measurable consequences. Diversity is
compelling because it represents and expresses a defining aspiration.
It is defining in the sense that its pursuit is pivotal to a vast array of
public choices and, ultimately, to society’s fundamental conception of
its own morality.
Acknowledging that diversity is a compelling purpose in this
sense does not at all imply that it is beyond criticism even as an
aspiration. Not only are some of its immediate effects objectionable
and its long-run consequences speculative, but, more fundamentally
its underlying moral vision is itself controversial if only for being
premised on race consciousness. The dream of a color-blind society,
in which every individual’s value is independent of race, is (needless
to say) also profoundly compelling. The very ambivalence in the
Court’s diversity opinions manifests a recognition that on the great
questions of social and political direction, various goals, even
opposite ones, can represent powerful moral commitments among
which the public is entitled to choose.
II. ASSESSING MORAL REGULATION
I suspect that some who strongly approve of the Court’s decision
in Grutter will nevertheless be uneasy with my account of why
diversity is a compelling public interest. The reason for this unease is
not hard to identify. If an interest as diffuse, costly, uncertain, and
controversial as diversity is important enough to permit the
government to override an individual’s liberty interest, there may be
a very broad range of objectives that justify restrictions on liberty.
Indeed, the whole enterprise of interest assessment may be in
jeopardy. This possibility, it seems to me, is not a reason to simplify or
distort one’s understanding of why diversity is a compelling interest.
Rather, it is a reason to think further about the practice of interest
assessment in constitutional cases.
Consider the nature of the states’ interest in regulating private
sexual conduct, an issue that the Supreme Court happened to have
taken up at almost the same time that it was assessing the importance
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of racial diversity at the University of Michigan Law School. In
Lawrence v. Texas,45 the Court concluded that a criminal prohibition
on private homosexual conduct “furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify . . . intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”46 A cursory reading of this sentence might leave the
impression that the Justices were asserting that the state had no
legitimate interest in regulating private sexual conduct. However, the
phrasing actually suggests that Texas did have such an interest but
that its interest, though legitimate, was not strong enough to justify a
particular degree of intrusions into the right of privacy. Elsewhere the
opinion acknowledged the nature of the state’s legitimate interest:
[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons
these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions
accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and
47
which thus determine the course of their lives.

The Court quickly proceeded to say that “[t]hese considerations [did]
not answer the question [in Lawrence,]” which was whether this
moral position may be enforced “on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law.”48
In other words, although it is true that the legitimacy of the
state’s moral position was not dispositive in Lawrence—because it
had to be balanced against the state’s interference with the right to
privacy—it is equally true that the importance of that moral interest
was not wholly irrelevant. As Grutter made quite clear, even core
constitutional interests of an individual can be sacrificed for a
sufficiently important governmental purpose. So, the question is
unavoidable: If diversity in higher education is a compelling
governmental interest, is there any basis for denying that status to the
moral objectives that animate prohibitions against homosexual
conduct?
The Lawrence majority suggested one answer even as it
described Texas’s moral position respectfully. Note again its words:
45.
46.
47.
48.

123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
Id. at 2484.
Id. at 2480.
Id.
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“For many persons, . . . [the state’s moral position reflects] profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their
49
lives.” This phrasing suggests that the moral principles animating the
Texas prohibition are entitled to respect because their proponents use
them in shaping their own hopes and choices. They are, the phrasing
implies, important expressions of morality for the private domain but
not for the public arena. Thus, if the Court had felt called upon to
reconcile its assessment of the moral interest in suppressing
homosexual behavior with its assessment of the government’s interest
in racial diversity, it could have noted that those who support
diversity in higher education are pursuing a moral vision of public
life—a vision of how law school classes should function, of how the
races should interact in businesses and other organizations, and of
how society’s leadership can earn legitimacy.
The decisive answer to this distinction between private and
public spheres was provided long ago in Professor Ronald Dworkin’s
“reconstruction,” as he called it, of Lord Devlin’s argument in favor
of moral regulation.50 Professor Dworkin’s interpretation of Devlin is
worth reading:
If those who have homosexual desires freely indulged them, our
social environment would change. What the changes would be
cannot be calculated with any precision, but it is plausible to
suppose . . . that the position of the family, as the assumed and
natural institution around which the educational, economic and
recreational arrangements of men center, would be undermined . . . .
We are too sophisticated to suppose that the effects of an increase in
homosexuality would be confined to those who participate in the
practice . . . just as we are too sophisticated to suppose that prices
and wages affect only those who negotiate them. The environment
in which we and our children must live is determined . . . by patterns
51
and relationships formed privately by others than ourselves.

Notice that this version of Lord Devlin’s argument does not depend
on any demonstration that homosexual conduct is in itself immoral. It
could be, as the Lawrence Court repeatedly asserted, that judgments
about private sexual morality must be made by individuals or even
49. Id. at 2480.
50. Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J.
.986 (1966).
51. Id. at 992–93.
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that homosexual conduct is at least sometimes a moral good;
nevertheless Devlin would still be right that permitting this conduct
could lead to public harms. The right to negotiate a twelve-hour
workday—or, for that matter, to gain admission to the Michigan Law
School on a race-neutral basis—is not in itself immoral, yet the
exercise of these private rights can frustrate legitimate public
purposes.
Professor Dworkin’s sympathetic account of Lord Devlin’s
argument does not mean that he accepts Devlin’s conclusions.
Dworkin attempts to rebut Devlin’s argument on its own terms.52 He
claims that Devlin recognizes that the legislator’s decision to protect
social institutions from private conduct is a difficult one, because the
legislator must decide “whether the institutions which seem
threatened are sufficiently valuable to protect at the cost of human
freedom.”53 The legislator, however, can proceed with some
confidence when the private behavior is immoral because in that case
there is less need for a strong public justification. Dworkin, with
characteristic self-assurance, proceeds to argue that the moral
position condemning private homosexuality does not meet minimal
social standards regarding moral reasoning.
This criticism, even if convincing as far as it goes, is plainly an
incomplete reply to Lord Devlin’s argument as Professor Dworkin
himself describes that argument. Unaccountably, Dworkin loses sight

52. Professor Dworkin’s choice of counterargument does not mean, of course, that there
are no other possible critiques of Lord Devlin’s position. Dworkin mentions in passing several
other possible lines of attack—that society is not at all entitled to protect itself from a change in
social institutions, or (more modestly) that the threatened change must be imminent, or that the
immorality of an act ought not to count “in determining whether to make it criminal,” or that
legislators must make the moral judgment for themselves and “not refer such issues to the
community at large.” Id. at 993–94. Given Dworkin’s later writings, it is also worthwhile to
mention the argument that moral condemnation cannot be based on religious conviction. See
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). Only the first two of these claims could be
dispositive of Devlin’s argument (as Dworkin describes that argument), given that moral
condemnation is only necessary as a justification when the value of the social institutions at risk
is not clear. It is hard to imagine the basis for an argument that society is never entitled to
protect itself from a destructive change in social institutions. It is possible to imagine an
argument for the proposition that the change must be imminent, but surely such arguments lose
force to the extent that the value of the endangered social institutions is great. The Court in
Grutter imposed no requirement that serious risks, such as the gradual loss of governmental
legitimacy, be imminent. The family, too, one would think, is a sufficiently valuable institution
to warrant protection from remote risks. See infra text accompanying notes 53–55.
53. Dworkin, supra note 50, at 993.
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of his own recognition that Devlin’s position does not require that
54
private conduct always be immoral to justify public regulation. It
follows from Dworkin’s account of Devlin that it is possible for a
legislator to be confident that threatened social institutions are highly
valuable and that, in such circumstances, the cost in human freedom
might be worthwhile whether or not the regulated behavior is
immoral. Dworkin simply assumes that the institutions threatened by
repealing antisodomy laws are not so clearly valuable as to make
judgments about the morality of homosexuality unnecessary.
To summarize, Professor Dworkin’s discussion shows that the
question of whether there is a compelling public purpose in
prohibiting private homosexual conduct is not answered by
distinguishing between the private and public spheres and that it is
logically separate from the question of whether the private conduct is
moral. If the importance of the governmental interest is to be
assessed,55 there is simply no escaping the need to identify and
evaluate the social institutions that may be threatened by legalizing
homosexual acts.
The Lawrence Court, to its credit, made more of an effort at this
essential inquiry than does Professor Dworkin. It pointed to various
pieces of evidence suggesting that a strong social consensus in favor
56
of outlawing private homosexual acts no longer exists. This
information is relevant to an assessment of the importance of the
state’s interest because, to the extent that a society does not aspire to
the sorts of relationships, institutions, and ideals that would be
undermined by legalized homosexuality, that society would not be
threatened by such legalization. However, if one agrees with the
Court that racial diversity in higher education is a compelling
governmental interest, it is obvious that significant social dissensus

54. Professor Dworkin’s words are:
We do not need so strong a justification, in terms of the social importance of the
institutions being protected, if we are confident that no one has a moral right to do
what we want to prohibit . . . . This does not claim that immorality is sufficient to
make conduct criminal; it argues, rather, that on occasion it is necessary.
Id. (emphasis added).
55. Professor Dworkin’s argument against Lord Devlin’s position is entirely addressed to
moral assessment by legislators, not courts. Oddly, he adds a postscript on the question of moral
regulation of pornography that simply assumes that the same argument applies to judicial
decisionmaking. See id. at 1002–05.
56. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478–81 (2003) (noting, for example, that at the
time of the Court’s decision in Lawrence, only thirteen states prohibited sodomy, four of which
enforced their laws only against homosexuals).
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cannot, in itself, be sufficient to discredit a public purpose. After all,
the value of diversity programs is hotly contested in the political
arena, and, indeed, those programs are arguably incompatible with a
powerful, authoritatively expressed political consensus in favor of
nondiscrimination. Grutter is, I think, commonsensical on this point.
Whatever the ultimate boundaries of Lord Devlin’s argument for the
right of societal self-definition, it cannot be that a state’s purposes are
compelling only when they are noncontroversial. The great issues of
politics and morality are always controversial.
Fortunately, for present purposes it is not important to identify
the degree of consensus that Lord Devlin’s argument might require
before the state undertakes moral regulation on profound and
controversial issues. Whatever the abstract answer to that question, in
Lawrence the Justices effectively conceded that there is sufficient
social consensus about the importance of at least one of the
institutions that legalized homosexuality might threaten. Both the
majority opinion57 and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion58
sharply distinguished criminal prohibitions against homosexuality
from the validity of existing laws regulating marriage. And well they
might, for marriage is the primary institution that has been used all
over the world to tame the turbulent power of human sexuality, to
raise psychologically healthy children, to instill moral values, and to
provide for some degree of mutual protection and support. Whatever
its variations and shortcomings, if there is not sufficient social
consensus regarding the importance of the institution of heterosexual
marriage, it is hard to imagine any social arrangement the protection
of which could amount to a compelling interest. This is true
notwithstanding the existence of alternative models to traditional
marriage that are morally attractive and compatible with
homosexuality. A public purpose does not cease to be compelling
merely because deeply attractive alternatives exist, as Grutter’s
acknowledgement of the dream of a color-blind society as an
alternative to engineered diversity reminds us.

57. See id. at 2478 (distinguishing antisodomy laws from efforts by the state to define
personal relationships when there is “injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects”); id. at 2484 (“[This] case does not . . . . involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
58. See id. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex
relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution
of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”).
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Lawrence might seem to rest on the belief that the state’s interest
in protecting the institution of marriage, although morally compelling,
is only tenuously connected to the prohibited conduct. Many have
argued—and the Court seems to have been sure—that legalizing
homosexual sodomy will not lead to any destructive consequences for
family life. Indeed, arguments are available for the proposition that
even extending the right to marry to homosexuals (let alone
decriminalizing homosexual conduct) would be compatible with
wholesome family life. Once again, however, this explanation for
Lawrence is undermined by the Grutter Court’s determination that
racial diversity in higher education is a compelling public purpose.
Recall that every aspect of that purpose—the invigoration of
classroom discussion, the improvement of racial attitudes, the
achievement of harmony in the workplace, the legitimation of the
leadership class—is highly conjectural and, indeed, that diversity can
be and is viewed as a compelling interest no matter what the
immediate consequences. The Grutter opinion rested on the
proposition that great dreams, like the aspiration for racial harmony
and fairness, are sufficiently crucial to a society’s self-definition that
they can be worth expressing and pursuing despite the uncertainties
attending social causation in a complex and subtle world.
Even if legalized homosexuality might have some effect on social
climate that could indirectly undermine marriage, it is, obviously,
possible to protect marriage by more direct means than through the
regulation of homosexual behavior. However, Grutter also reminds us
that the fact that certain tangible objectives might be achieved by
more direct or limited means does not make the expressive functions
of public laws any less crucial to a society that ultimately reflects the
character and attitudes of those who comprise it.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s determination that racial diversity in higher
education is a compelling interest is, I have tried to demonstrate,
persuasive, but it is persuasive only on terms that confirm what
should have been obvious from the beginning. What should have
been obvious is that the nature of great social purposes is such that
they cannot be authoritatively ranked by judges or, for that matter, by
anyone else. They are the appropriate subject matter of continuing
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disagreement.59 Controversy, uncertainty, speculation, sacrifice—
these do not make purposes unimportant. They identify ideals, they
characterize dreams. American citizens have become inured to a
practice that is, I think, beyond justification. Much more is at stake in
recognizing this than the decisions on racial diversity and private
homosexual conduct. The practice of interest assessment reaches very
far; it constrains collective decisionmaking on moral issues that are
fundamental to society—establishing decent public dialogue,
fostering respect for human life, redressing a history of racial
discrimination, and fostering a minimal sense of respect for the
country.
Recognizing that courts cannot rank a society’s aspirations for
itself does not mean that all laws are constitutional. It means that
when courts invalidate a law, they should do so on some basis other
60
than interest assessment. But it must be acknowledged that,
depending on what inquiries are substituted for the royal prerogative
of interest deprecation, it is certainly possible that most laws would
survive constitutional review. This leads us back to the question that I
started with: How should one understand cases like Grutter in which
the Court validates a law on the ground that the public’s judgment
about the importance of a public purpose is entitled to judicial
respect? In such cases, should we understand the Court to be
authorizing the government to limit or amend the Constitution
merely because that seems justified to those in power? Or is the
better understanding that the Court is somehow allowing the
importance of governmental interests to define the meaning of our
Constitution?
As Grutter made explicit, there has always been a certain
implausibility in the common claim that a court does not qualify or
undermine constitutional limits when it validates a law on the ground
that the governmental interest is compelling. However, if we see the
Constitution not only as a legal document but also as a set of political
practices and understandings, this implausibility recedes. From this
perspective, it is the people’s judgment about the importance of their

59. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
60. There may be exceptions, of course; for example, the text of the Fourth Amendment,
referring to “unreasonable searches and seizures,” may direct a court to evaluate society’s
interests.
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61
objectives that informs and qualifies constitutional meaning. The
courts, in this circumstance, are not deferring to extraneous
judgments about social utility and moral aspiration. They are making
room for an aspect of constitutional self-definition that is inherently
political and cultural. This distinction is not at all a scholastic
subterfuge. It is realistic and accurate to describe the American
Constitution both as a legal document and as a set of political
understandings and arrangements.62 It follows from this recognition
that, insofar as the constitutionality of laws is thought to depend on
the legitimacy and importance of the public’s purposes, this aspect of
constitutional decisionmaking belongs to the public at large. For the
Court to understand this would not be abdication.

61. Unfortunately, the Grutter Court’s deference to university faculties and other elite
groups provides only limited evidence that it appreciates this possibility. The opinions of these
groups are not broadly representative of the whole population; moreover, their opinions on
diversity adopt the position taken by one of the Court’s own members years earlier in Bakke.
To the extent that Justice Powell’s opinion shaped subsequent policies and opinions on
diversity, the Court in Grutter is, in effect, deferring to itself. On the way in which Bakke shaped
public discourse on the issue of diversity, see LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 16.
62. Even the Court sometimes acknowledges the political nature of constitutional law, as
when it relies on the continuing repudiation of the Sedition Act as a basis for the conclusion that
defamations of public officials enjoy a partial First Amendment privilege, see N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964), or when it looks to sustained political traditions as a way of
defining “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710
(1997). The extensive scholarly writings on this subject include: NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENTS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
ABORTION DEBATE (1996); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION
AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); POWELL, supra note 2; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).

